by Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain in Heverlee, Belgium .
Written in English
Bibliography: leaf 22.
|Statement||by J. Jaskold-Gabszewicz and J.-P. Vial.|
|Series||CORE discussion papers,, no. 7042|
|Contributions||Vial, J. P., joint author.|
|LC Classifications||HF1009 .J37|
|The Physical Object|
|Number of Pages||22|
|LC Control Number||73173845|
Oligopoly "A la cournot" in a general equilibrium analysis. Jean Gabszewicz and Jean-Philippe Vial. Journal of Economic Theory, , vol. 4, issue 3, Date: References: Add references at CitEc Citations: View citations in EconPapers (98) Track citations by RSS feed. Downloads: (external link)Cited by: JASKOLD GABSZEWICZ, Jean & VIAL, Jean-Philippe, "Oligopoly "à la Cournot" in a general equilibrium analysis," CORE Discussion Papers RP , Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). The Cournot Augustus Cournot (–). oligopoly model is the most popular model of imperfect competition. It is a model in which the number of firms matters, and it represents one way of thinking about what happens when the world . Traditional general equilibrium theory, as exemplified in Walras (–7) and Hicks (), was concerned only with perfect competition, though it was preceded by Cournot’s theory of oligopoly (), where perfect competition is only a limiting case of by:
Mostly, in the literature, we see developments of the Nash–Cournot equilibrium towards the resolution of other research questions, especially connected with the asymptotic stability of a variously associated dynamical system (see ). Several books and papers introduced, with the classic models of oligopoly (Cournot model),Cited by: 1. Oligopoly theory dates to Cournot (), who investigated competition between two producers, the so-called duopoly problem, and is credited with being the first to study noncooperative behavior. In his treatise, the decisions made by the producers are said to be in equilibrium if no one can increase his/her income by unilateral action, given that the other producer does not Cited by: 1. General Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition Oligopoly ‘a la Cournot’ in a General Equilibrium Analysis. ” Monopoly D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L21 - Business Objectives of Cited by: 6. Drawing on recent work, a model of oligopoly in general equilibrium is sketched. The model ensures theoretical consistency by assuming that firms are large in their own markets but small in the economy as a whole, and ensures tractability by assuming quadratic preferences defined over a continuum of by:
equilibrium in strategies of this sort, i.e., with a "Markov perfect equilibrium" (MPE). Then, in Section 3, we begin the formal analysis of our project with a study of models where firms compete in capacities (quantities) and in which fixed costs are so large that only one firm can make a profit. For the exogenous timing. In this paper, after proving the existence of a unique equilibrium in Cournot mixed oligopoly under general conditions on the market demand and each firm’s cost function, we derive conditions ensuring the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the mixed oligopoly where one public firm and at least one of the private firms are active in a Author: Koji Okuguchi, Takeshi Yamazaki. This paper analyses the dynamics of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly with general isoelastic demand (quasi-linear preferences) and quantity-setting firms that . Vives ()). The Stackelberg equilibrium may be conceived as a perfect Nash equilibrium of a two stage game under perfect information, where each player moves in a prescribed order (Kreps ()). This paper aims at extending the analysis of oligopolistic competition proposed by Stackelberg to a general equilibrium framework.